How many warheads, which ICBMs have actually flown, how many soldiers went to Russia, and how the North stacks up against South Korea and US Forces Korea.
South Korea's Ministry of National Defense (MND) puts North Korea's standing forces at about 1.28 million active-duty personnel. The figure is the same in the 2020 and 2022 Defense White Papers; the 2022 edition came out in February 2023. It is an external estimate. Pyongyang has not published a figure.
The 2022 White Paper also counts about 4,300 tanks, 2,600 armored vehicles, 8,800 artillery systems and 5,500 multiple rocket launchers. It says around 70% of the army, 60% of the navy and 40% of combat aircraft are deployed south of the Pyongyang–Wonsan line, the part of the country closest to the border. The White Paper itself does not rate equipment quality.
| Category | North Korea | South Korea / US | Source and year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Active troops | ~1.28 million | ~450,000 (ROK) | ROK MND 2022 White Paper; MND data reported Aug 2025 |
| Tanks | ~4,300 | ~2,130 | ROK MND White Papers (NK 2022 ed.; ROK 2020 ed.) |
| Artillery systems | ~8,800 | ~6,000 | ROK MND White Papers (NK 2022 ed.; ROK 2020 ed.) |
| Multiple rocket launchers | ~5,500 | ~270 | ROK MND White Papers (NK 2022 ed.; ROK 2020 ed.) |
| US Forces Korea (legal floor) | — | 28,500 minimum without certification to Congress | US FY2026 NDAA troop-level provision |
South Korea's own forces are getting smaller. MND data given to a lawmaker in August 2025 showed about 450,000 active troops, roughly 20% fewer than in 2019, mainly because fewer men are reaching enlistment age. Head-count comparisons leave out technology, training, air power and the US alliance, so on their own they do not measure the overall military balance.
No one outside North Korea knows the exact number. The main independent estimates fall between about 50 and about 60 assembled warheads. All of them say the North has enough fissile material to build more.
| Estimating body | Assembled warheads | Fissile material for | Date of estimate |
|---|---|---|---|
| SIPRI Yearbook 2026 | ~60 | up to ~90 warheads | January 2026 |
| SIPRI Yearbook 2025 | ~50 | up to ~90 warheads | January 2025 |
| FAS / Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook | ~50 | up to ~90 warheads | 2024 |
| ROK MND Defense White Paper | not stated | ~70 kg plutonium plus a substantial amount of HEU | 2022 edition |
SIPRI says nearly all the warheads are probably lower-yield single-stage fission weapons, with possibly only a few thermonuclear designs. North Korea has carried out six nuclear tests, the last in September 2017. No nuclear test has been reported since, including in 2026. North Korea has never confirmed a warhead count.
North Korea's long-range missiles fall into three groups. Some have been flight-tested. Some have only been shown at parades or tested on the ground. For others, most of the information comes from North Korean state media.
| System | Fuel | Status | Last confirmed event |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hwasong-17 | Liquid | Flight-tested | Tested 2022–2023 |
| Hwasong-18 | Solid | Flight-tested | Third test 18 Dec 2023 |
| Hwasong-19 | Solid | Flight-tested | 31 Oct 2024: ~86-minute flight, apogee above 7,000 km, ~1,000 km range (lofted) |
| Hwasong-20 | Solid | Displayed and ground-tested only | KCNA reported a ground test of an upgraded ~2,500 kN solid-fuel engine on 29 Mar 2026 (test date not given), after a ~1,970 kN test in Sep 2025; parade debut 10 Oct 2025; no flight test reported |
The Hwasong-19 flight on 31 October 2024 is the most recent ICBM launch confirmed by South Korean, Japanese and US reporting. In April 2026, South Korean media reported that the North had not launched an ICBM since the second Trump administration began in January 2025. South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not identify any of the 2026 launches described below as an ICBM.
Analysts and North Korean state media say the Hwasong-20 can carry multiple warheads or reach about 15,000 km. No flight test has shown either. The defense plan announced at the February 2026 party congress lists goals such as land- and sea-based ICBM systems and more reconnaissance satellites. These are stated goals and have not been demonstrated.
In 2025, launches tracked by South Korea and Japan included a hypersonic intermediate-range missile on 6 January, short-range missiles flying up to about 800 km on 8 May, and hypersonic missiles on 22 October. The Hwasong-20 was shown at the 10 October 2025 parade but not launched.
The 2026 launch series began on 4 January and continued through October. The table lists selected launches reported from JCS or Japanese Defense Ministry statements. It is not a complete list. The outlets that reported each launch are listed under Sources.
| Date (2026) | Launch site | What was detected | Reported range |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 January | Pyongyang area | Several ballistic missiles; first launch of 2026 | ~900–950 km (Japan MoD) |
| 7–8 April | Pyongyang area / East Sea | Projectiles on consecutive days, assessed as likely ballistic; one showed anomalies early in flight | not released |
| 12 August | Wonsan area | Ballistic missile; JCS called it the 11th ballistic launch of the year | 700 km or more (JCS) |
| 20 August | Pyongyang area | About 10 short-range ballistic missiles, during the scaled-down US–ROK drill | ~300 km (JCS) |
| 12 September | Wonsan area | Several ballistic missiles, the day after the US–Japan–ROK Freedom Edge exercise ended | not released |
| 20 September | East coast | Two short-range ballistic missiles about three hours apart | ~450 km and 600+ km (JCS) |
| 3 October | Wonsan area | One ballistic missile, during the DMZ landmine dispute | 700 km or more (JCS) |
On 4 October, North Korea's state news agency KCNA said the 3 October launch was an intermediate-range hypersonic strategic missile that hit a target about 1,000 km away. That is North Korea's own claim. The JCS figure was 700 km or more, and South Korea and the United States had not published a final missile type when this guide was written.
There is no single agreed count of North Korea's 2026 missile launches. Japan's Defense Ministry, South Korea's JCS and news agencies count differently. Some count launch events and some count days, and they treat rockets and cruise missiles differently. One South Korean report called the 3 October launch the 15th ballistic launch of the year, but this guide could not confirm how that count was made.
North Korea began sending troops to Russia in autumn 2024. US, South Korean and Ukrainian officials put the first deployment at about 10,000–12,000. In April 2025, Pyongyang first acknowledged that it had sent combat troops to help retake Russia's Kursk region.
| Item | Figure | Who says so | When |
|---|---|---|---|
| Troops in Kursk region | ~11,000 (~10,000 combat, ~1,000 engineers) | South Korea's NIS (via Yonhap) | February 2026 |
| Total sent since 2024 | ~15,000 | Ukrainian and South Korean estimates (AP, Al Jazeera) | September 2026 |
| Killed | ~2,000 | NIS, via lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun | September 2025 |
| Killed or wounded | ~6,000 | NIS (via Yonhap); UK Defence Intelligence gave a similar figure (June 2025) | February 2026 |
| POWs sent to South Korea | 2 | Ukrainian President Zelenskyy at the UN General Assembly | September 2026 |
These casualty figures come from intelligence services and have not been independently verified. The estimates have risen over time: about 300 killed (early 2025), about 600 killed and 4,700 casualties (April 2025), about 2,000 killed (September 2025), and about 6,000 killed or wounded (February 2026). Russia and North Korea have not released numbers.
The NIS also said about 1,100 soldiers went home in December 2025 and could be sent back. Its assessment is that the North has gained modern combat experience and Russian technical help with its weapons. The two prisoners of war had been captured in Kursk in January 2025. Seoul has said it will accept North Korean POWs who want to come to the South.
The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is a 4 km-wide buffer along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), set by the 1953 Armistice. The 2018 inter-Korean military agreement (the "9·19 agreement") was meant to reduce tension there. North Korea scrapped it in November 2023, and South Korea suspended it in full in June 2024.
In 2026 the two sides changed their border posture in opposite directions. According to MND, North Korean troops built fences as close as 80–90 m from the MDL and cleared ground for minefields. MND called this a violation of the Armistice. The UN Command (UNC) said fence construction is not automatically a violation and has to be judged case by case. It did rule that the September mine incident was an Armistice violation (see below). On the southern side, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back proposed in April 2026 to cut frontline guard troops from about 22,000 to about 6,000 by 2040 and replace them with sensors, AI and robots.
The JCS assessment drew on forensic testing by the National Forensic Service, which found TNT residue on soldiers' gear, and on a joint field investigation with the UN Command, which concluded that an Armistice violation had occurred. North Korea denies placing the mine.
North Korea announces only the share of its state budget that goes to defense, never the amount. At the March 2026 session of the Supreme People's Assembly, it allocated 15.8% of the 2026 budget to defense, compared with 15.7% for 2025. It is not known what this category covers, and research institutes in Seoul assume a large part of military spending is outside the official budget.
| Item | North Korea | South Korea |
|---|---|---|
| Latest budget figure | 15.8% of 2026 state budget (no amount given) | 73.28 trillion won (~US$54 billion) proposed for 2027 |
| Change | up from 15.7% in 2025 | up from the 2026 budget (year-on-year rate not confirmed for this guide) |
| Notable items | not disclosed | ~100 billion won to start nuclear-powered submarine design; 12.17 trillion won for OPCON transfer and self-reliant defense |
South Korea's 2027 figure is a government proposal. The National Assembly can change it, and its legal deadline for passing the budget is 2 December 2026. Seoul has also set a goal of spending 3.5% of GDP on defense by 2035. That is a stated goal, not a legal requirement.
Doctrine and planning. The February party congress approved a new five-year defense plan. South Korean think tanks say it puts less weight on adding warheads and more on how nuclear forces are commanded and used. Its goals include submarine-launched systems, military satellites and electronic warfare. Kim Jong Un now describes South Korea as the North's "principal enemy."
Alliance exercises. Ulchi Freedom Shield, the main US–South Korea summer exercise, was cut from 11 to 5 days (17–21 August) after President Trump publicly directed a scale-down on 16 August. The JCS said the change was made at the US side's proposal. The US–Japan–South Korea Freedom Edge exercise went ahead from 7 to 11 September. The US FY2026 defense authorization law restricts reducing US Forces Korea below 28,500 without certification to Congress.
Missiles. North Korea kept up ballistic missile launches, mostly short-range according to South Korean and Japanese assessments. As of 11 October 2026, it had not flight-tested an ICBM in 2026 and had not conducted a nuclear test.
As of October 2026, the most recent independent estimate comes from SIPRI's Yearbook 2026: about 60 assembled warheads as of January 2026, up from about 50 a year earlier, and enough fissile material for up to about 90. FAS and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated about 50 in 2024. North Korea has never confirmed a number.
As of October 2026, South Korea's Ministry of National Defense (2022 Defense White Paper) puts North Korea's active forces at about 1.28 million. The same White Paper counts about 4,300 tanks, 8,800 artillery systems and 5,500 multiple rocket launchers. South Korea had about 450,000 active troops according to MND data reported in 2025. US law (the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act) restricts reducing US Forces Korea below 28,500 without certification to Congress.
As of October 2026, no. South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff did not identify any 2026 launch as an ICBM, and South Korean media reported in April 2026 that no ICBM had been launched since January 2025. The last confirmed ICBM flight was the Hwasong-19 on 31 October 2024 (AP, Stars and Stripes). The Hwasong-20 was shown at an October 2025 parade and its engines have been ground-tested, according to KCNA, but it has not flown.
As of October 2026, South Korea's National Intelligence Service has estimated about 2,000 killed (September 2025) and about 6,000 killed or wounded in the Kursk region (February 2026, via Yonhap). Ukrainian and South Korean estimates reported in September 2026 (AP, Al Jazeera) put total deployments since 2024 at about 15,000. Russia and North Korea have not released casualty figures.
As of October 2026, the most recent launch was on 3 October 2026. South Korea's JCS said one ballistic missile was fired from the Wonsan area and flew 700 km or more. North Korea's KCNA said it was an intermediate-range hypersonic missile that hit a target about 1,000 km away, which is North Korea's own claim. The previous launch, on 20 September, was two short-range ballistic missiles (JCS, via Stars and Stripes).
As of October 2026, North Korea's only published figure is a share of its budget. According to its Supreme People's Assembly, as reported by Sputnik and Seoul-based analysts, it allocated 15.8% of its 2026 state budget to defense, up from 15.7% in 2025. It does not disclose amounts. According to its Defense Ministry, South Korea has proposed 73.28 trillion won (about US$54 billion) for 2027.